THE “CRIME” FETISH
May 8, 2015
My recent critique of
NYPD-based, CompStat enabled, “broken windows” police (“’Broken Windows’
Unjustified,” May 6) rests on two decades trying to understand what “crime” and
“criminality” statistics mean, from a law-school class in 1967, through the
study “Explaining Police-Recorded Crime Trends in Sheffield (UK)” (Contemporary Crises 11, pp. 59-73, Jan.
1987; pdf’s of this and other articles
cited here available on request to those who can’t get them online).
The class on “crime and society”
was taught by the Executive Director of the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, James Vorenberg, and the Director of
its Task Force on Assessment of Crime, just before the Commission issued its
reports in 1967. There we were introduced
to national victim surveys, the first of their kind. Our primary question on the final exam was to
imagine oneself to be a congressional intern advising on the significance of
rising police-reported crime rates. I
wrote that the connection between what police reported and what actually
happened in communities they policed was unknown. I got one of my two worst law-school grades
in that course, which inspired my choice of sociology dissertation topic
several years later.
For my dissertation, in a “high-crime”
area of Minneapolis, I gathered over 80 items of information, starting with the
date, time, and code given in the call for service, describing and detailing
any interactions with complainants/witnesses, ending with what offense, if any
was reported. In 373 calls for service
during 500 hours of patrol, on all shifts, over a period of about one year, 97
offenses of all kinds were reported.
Ninety-three of those reports occurred after the dispatcher had named an
offense in the call, where the police founded a complainant’s naming of any
offense, while in at least 22 calls where the dispatcher had not named an
offense but complainants had described one, no offense reports were filed. In sum, when dispatchers sent police to check
on offenses and they found corroboration of any offense, they created crime
statistics. Without that signal from
dispatchers, police never reported offenses, regardless of what complainants
reported. The police, meanwhile,
believed that their decisions were simply based on the evidence at hand, and
were surprised by the results. The study
was published as “Police Patrolmen’s Offense-Reporting Behavior,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency
13 (Jan. 1976, pp. 33-47). And so I
learned that police discretion whether to report create crime statistics can rest
heavily on factors independent of “the true” incidence or rate of crime.
I am grateful to my dissertation
adviser, Marvin Wolfgang, for the access he gave me to his copious files of reprints
of articles on the history of crime measurement from Europe to the United States. I supplemented my Minneapolis findings with a
critique of “The Growth of Crime [Measurement] in the United States” (Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Sciences, Jan. 1976, pp. 22-30).
I traced how the size and political weight of “the crime problem” had
grown, from judicial data beginning early in the 19th century, to
newly touted victim and self-report survey data. This comparison of measures of crime evolved
into a book, Crime Control Strategies: An
Introduction to the Study of Crime (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1980), where
a chapter at a time I “evaluated chances of controlling rates” of convictions,
arrests, police offense reports,” victimization reports, self-reports, and
recidivism, plus a chapter on cost-benefit analyses. In each category, compared choices of rate
numerators and denominators, type I and II error factors in applying statistics
using the measures, political considerations in implementation, and side
effects of policies based on those data, where I traced trends in victimization
and differences in self-reporting to changes in interviewing and in respondents’
relationships with data collectors.
Fundamentally, crime and criminality trends reflected trends and
differences in the behavior of the data gatherers and in how the data providers
perceived themselves in the eyes of their interrogators.
This was followed by two
longitudinal studies of police crime reporting.
The first was an analysis of police offense reports and arrests, with
William Selke: “The Politics of Police
Reporting in Indianapolis, 1948-1978,” Law
and Human Behavior 6 (Dec. 1982: 329-342).
Police data were supplemented by news reports from the Indianapolis Star
and News. When two-way radios in patrol
cars were introduced in the latter 1950s, “index” crime reports shot up. Criticized for failure to curb mounting
crime, the Indianapolis police turned their focus to making arrests, which rose
as reported offenses declined. Then
public complaints that police weren’t taking offense reports and weren’t
clearing offenses by arrest. In the
uproar, offense reports swung upward while arrests declined, until public alarm
over police losing control of crime swung the trends back. I labeled these recurring cycles t“the roller
coaster effect” of law enforcement reporting.
This brought home to me the inverse relationship between trends in index
offense rates, and arrests, most of which are for public order offenses rather
than “serious crime.” THIS NEGATIVE
RELATIONSHIP--BETWEEN INDEX OFFENSE REPORTING AND PUBLIC ORDER ARRESTS (AND THE
STOPS AND FRISKS THAT PRECEDE THEM)--EXPLAINS HOW COMPSTAT-GROUNDED BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING PROMOTES CHRONICALLY EXCESSIVE, OCCASIONALLY HOMICIDAL, POLICE USE OF
FORCE, AND ATTENDANT WAVES OF PROTEST AGAINST THE WAY LAW IS ENFORCED IN LOW-INCOME
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN PARTICULAR.
In the Sheffield study cited
above, I had great assistance of the police in gathering extraordinarily detailed
monthly printouts of crime recording records, and in interpreting patterns
there from 1974-1979. In this and in
trends from earlier years, a variety of demographic changes failed to
correspond to social and economic shifts.
However, with a surge of more highly educated recruits, during their
first two years of probationary status, reports of “notifiable” offences
climbed dramatically. It was followed by
a wave of criticism that the police “clear-up” (crime solving) rate had fallen
below the normally acceptable fifty percent.
Patrol constables were reportedly instructed to avoid taking nuisance
reports for offenses that could not be cleared.
AS IN INDIANAPOLIS, records in Sheffield show an ensuing rise in arrests
on one hand, in offense reports being “no crimed” (wiped off the books) more,
and in previously reported offenses being “cleared” as “taken into
consideration” (TIC-ed) during suspect interrogations, while notifiable
offenses dropped, and clear-up rates rose back to acceptable levels.
I concluded the Sheffield study
by calling for a moratorium on using counts of crime and criminality to
evaluate and implement criminal justice policy.
I had also envisioned how police and community members together could
formulate and apply performance evaluation criteria that included a variety of
ways police could “protect and serve” communities (in “Better Living Through
Police Discretion,” Law and Contemporary
Problems 47, no. 4, 1984, pp. 249-267), for police and civilians to build
trust, respect and growing sense of safety and security together. Not only does “broken windows” policing
endanger police and civilian lives alike; statistical evidence that it works is
illusory.
It took me a long time to give
up on finding any connection between reported crimes and the lives of people in
the communities from which reports are taken, and has led me instead to focus
on ways human relations deteriorate or grow safer and more dependable in
parallel fashion at all social levels, in all social settings (a paradigm laid
out in Peacemaking: Reflections of a
Radical Criminologist, UOttawa Press, 2006; final page proofs for free
download at www.critcrim.org [site currently
down for maintenance; I have a copy]).
I am aware that how centrally
grounded criminological knowledge, and criminal justice policy and practice,
are grounded in the assumption that lower crime rates and more crime control
activity are evidence that the criminal justice system works. I want colleagues especially to know that I
have not arrived at my rejection of the validity of this research construct
lightly. Love and peace, hal